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FEDERAL PROTECTION FOR ARCHAEOLOGICAL
RESOURCES

Ronald H. Rosenberg*

A nation's cultural history is a precious component of its identity.
Knowledge of past civilizations and lifeways becomes intertwined with
a national self-image. But history as a series of events cannot be recreated and prior civilizations cannot be reestablished in the present.
What remains of the country's patrimony is the physical evidence of
earlier societies-abandoned sites of past human activity and artifacts
reflecting preexisting patterns of living. For nearly a century American
national policy has recognized the value of protecting archaeologically
significant sites, particularly when they reflect major social or architectural accomplishments. 1 As will be discussed at length below, domestic
policy was initially directed to the preservation of particular sites located on federal land by removing them from the public domain and
thus the possibility of private ownership? Next, the legislative approach shifted to provide a criminal law sanction against those who
• Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law. B.A., 1971, Columbia University; Master of Regional Planning, 1974, University ofNorth
Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D., 1975, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. In 1889, Congress appropriated funds to protect and repair the CasaGrande ruin located
in Pinal County, Arizona, and to permit the President to reserve the land from settlement and sale.
Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 411, 25 Stat. 961. This provision, a relatively insignificant portion of the
Interior Department's appropriation, allotted $2,000 for the project On June 22, 1892, President
Benjamin Harrison formally reserved the ruin and 480 acres around it; the legal description of the
protected federal land, however, was incorrect, and President William H. Taft had to correct it by
Presidential Proclamation in 1910. 36 Stat. 2505. It was officially made a national monument by
President Woodrow Wilson in 1918. 40 Stat. 1818.
2. The removal of a particular parcel of public land from developmental pressure has been
viewed as an effective method of preserving archaeologically significant and other important
properties. The early inclusion of Presidential power to reserve federal lands for "national monuments" in the 1906 Antiquities Act reflects the importance of this technique in the development of
federal preservation policy. See Act of June 8, 1906, Pub. L. No. 34-209, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The intergovernmental friction inherent in the exercise of such a power is well illustrated by Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. I 155 (D.
Alaska 1978), where the State of Alaska challenged a Presidential declaration setting aside a large
number of acres in the state as a national monument. /d. at 1159-60.
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would disrupt or damage archaeological sites. 3 Most recently the idea
of cultural value has been integrated into the expanding conception of
environmental quality, with the result that cultural resources have received the same protections available to natural environmental interests.4 This final development reflects the view that a desirable quality
of life requires not only clean air and water but also the availability of
cultural resources. In an age when it is argued that the protection of
many environmental assets must be justified on the basis of economic
efficiency, the support for cultural resources represents a recognition
that certain objects and places hold an intrinsic value to society and
must be preserved for their uniqueness and the information they can
provide.
This Article is concerned with the emerging federal law protecting
sites and objects having archaeological significance. Today, archaeological resources are vulnerable to damage or obliteration by a number
of forces. Some of these factors are subject to governmental control,
and some are not. Most obviously, archaeological sites and artifacts
can be adversely affected as a direct or an indirect result of public or
private development activity. For example, an archaeologically significant site or artifact may be destroyed or damaged as a by-product of
construction activity. A broad range of statutory provisions require
that advance planning consideration be given to the cultural impact of
federal or federally related actions. 5 These specialized federal review
statutes have done much to sensitize agencies to the need to plan
projects and programs that will not adversely affect cultural resources. 6
3. See 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1976).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 433l(b)(4) (1976) (National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [NEPA))
which states in part:
[I]t is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable
means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and
coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation
may . . . (4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national
heritage. . . .
I d.
5. See 16 U.S.C. § 470(1) (1976) (National Historic Preservation Act [NHPA)); 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332 (1976) (National Environmental Policy Act of 1969); 49 U.S.C. § 1653(1) (1976) (Department of Transportation Act); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1500.6 (1980) (Council on Environmental Quality regulations implementing NEPA); Exec. Order No, 11,593, 3 C.F.R. 154 (1971), reprinted in l6
U.S.C. § 470 app., at 429 (1976); Advisory Council on Historic Preservation regulations, 36 C.F.R.
§§ 800.1-800.15 (1979). Of the listed materials, the Council on Environmental Quality's regulations implementing NEPA and the regulations of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
are the most important federal provisions requiring prior review of potentially harmful federal
actions. Specialized environmental review statutes are increasingly the focus of litigation challenging a variety of federal actions. See Rosenberg, Federal Protection of Unique Environmental
Interests: Endangered and Threatened Species, 58 N.C. L. REV. 491, 508-16 (1980).
6. Undoubtedly federal court decisions that have enjoined federal agency actions not in
compliance with the review requirements of 16 U.S.C. § 470(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) have been
partly responsible for this new agency awareness. See WATCH v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.
1979); Wisconsin Heritages, Inc. v. Harris, 460 F.Supp. 1120 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Weintraub v. Rural
Electrification Administration, 457 F.Supp. 78 (M.D. Pa. 1978), Hall County Historical Soc'y v.
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Other state or local requirements can be imposed to regulate the proposed activity.7 In these ways, the legal system has protected archaeological values in much the same fashion as it protects more commonly
recognized environmental interests. 8
The fact that many archaeological resources are considered highly
valuable art objects creates an additional threat to their existence.
With the value of artifacts on the domestic and international art markets rapidly escalating, the search for these highly prized objects has
been pursued on the vast federally owned or controlled landholdings
located mainly in the southwestern portion of the nation. 9 Private collectors have enhanced their own collections at the expense of the general public by illegally taking artifacts from public lands. Vandals, as
always, have done their damage through wanton destruction even
though not motivated by economic gain. These acts have resulted in
the pillage of important archaeological sites which often have substantial religious significance to American Indian tribes. This phenomenon
has resulted not only in the loss of valuable objects 10 but also in the
destruction of scientific information concerning the existence of prior
societies who lived on the North American continent. This exploitation
of archaeological artifacts and sites, when considered in combination
with the damage caused by developmental activities and the forces of
nature, represents a serious threat to the national cultural heritage.
When an archaeological resource is lost by reason of theft or damage,
unique data of a truly irreplaceable nature are lost forever. 11
Georgia Dep't ofTransp., 447 F.Supp. 741 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Aluli v. Brown, 437 F.Supp. 602 (D.
Hawaii 1977). At least two federal agencies have issued regulations pertaining to cultural resources protection and compliance with the regulatory statutes mentioned above. See 7 C.F.R.
§§ 656.1-656.9 (1980) (Soil Conservation Service); 33 C.F.R. §§ 305.1-305.20 (1979) (Army Corps
of Engineers).
7. A number of state and local governments have acted to protect archaeological resources.
See C. McGIMSEY, PUBLIC ARCHEOLOGY 125-234 (1972); Beckwith, Developments in the Law of
Historic Preservation and a Reflection on Liberty, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 93, 188-203 (1976).
8. Even the general purpose environmental review statute (NEPA) requires a consideration
of cultural effects within the framework of the federal environmental impact statement [EIS]. See
note 4 supra. The Council on Environmental Quality's [CEQ's) impact statement regulations implicitly recognize the overlap in coverage between NEPA and NHPA. See 40 C.F.R.
~ l500.9(A)(l) (1980) (coordination of review provisions).
9. For example, in 1977, two Mimbres bowls taken from a site in the Gila National Forest
in southwestern New Mexico were sold by the apprehended site looters for $4,000. United States
v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939, 943 (lOth Cir. 1979).
10. Since these valuable artifacts are buried under the surface of lands owned or controlled
by the federal government, the position consistently taken by Congress and federal land management agencies has been that artifacts are items of personalty under federal ownership. As both the
owner of the locus in quo and the sovereign, the federal government has claimed comprehensive
rights to property under its control. In California ex rel Youngerv. Mead, 618 F.2d 618 (9th Cir.
1980}, the Ninth Circuit held that a large meteorite discovered on federal land in the Old Woman
Mountain Range in California could be removed and studied by the Smithsonian Institution
under a permit issued pursuant to the 1906 Antiquities Act. I d. at 620. The court added: "[W]e
interpret the Act and its legislative history to give the Secretary of Interior broad discretionary
power to dispose of objects of antiquity found on federal land under his jurisdiction." /d. at 621.
II. The loss is much the same as the extinction of an endangered plant or animal species: a
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Although government may directly control or limit its own actions
or those of a private entity using a federal permit, license, or support, 12
it may only deter nongovernmental activities indirectly by the use of
civil or criminal sanctions. No matter how effective federal policy is in
regulating actions of the federal government itself, it is of little value if
commercially motivated abuses remained unchecked. As will be discussed below, a 1974 Ninth Circuit decision invalidated the criminal
sanctions of the 1906 Antiquities Act which prohibited the looting of
"objects of antiquity" upon federallaJ?.dS. 13 Consequently, cultural resources located on federal lands were immediately exposed to a greater
danger-increasing commercial excavation for valuable artifacts. Congress, in enacting the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of
1979, 14 sought to deter the continued commercial pilfering of federal
lands by defining a narrow permit program for allowable archaeological excavation and by reinforcing it with the imposition of strengthened
civil and criminal penalties for unauthorized activities. 15 An examination of this statute will reveal the subtle and complex issues confronted
by Congress in attempting to apply traditional administrative and
criminal law principles to the novel problem of archaeological resource
protection. This Article will discuss the following questions: (1) What
was the preexisting legal structure and federal policy concerning the
protection of archaeological resources located on federal lands? (2)
Why was there a need for new federal legislation in this area? (3) How
did Congress perceive the issue of cultural resource protections on federal lands? (4) What specific action did Congress take to remedy the
insufficiencies in federal law? (5) How adequate was the congressional
response to the perceived need to act? The analysis of these issues will
reflect the emerging importance of cultural interests in federal land
management decisionmaking. On a broader plane, this Article will examine the development of federal policy protecting historical and
archaeological assets from both inadvertent and intentional actions of
the federal government and private individuals.
unique element of the world has been eliminated. In the context of archaeology, the loss of an
artifact or the destruction of a site can remove critical and rapidly diminishing data from present
and future evaluation.
12. See 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
13. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1974). q. United States v. Smyer, 596
F.2d 939 (lOth Cir. 1979).
14. Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721 (1979) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470// (Supp. III
1979)).
15. See text & notes 125-51 infta.
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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL RESOURCES

The history of federal involvement in the area of archaeological
preservation must be considered in conjunction with the growth of
public interest in and support for the protection of historic monuments
and structures. At an early stage in our nation's history, concern was
expressed over the deteriorating conditon of sites having historical significance, particularly those related to persons or events significant to
the history of the American Revolution. 16 In the nineteenth century,
local and national organizations were formed for the purpose of identifying historically important structures and preserving them from destructionP More often than not, however, little notice was taken of
buildings, districts, or sites which may have represented an architectural style or a life style of the past. In a growing nation which prided
itself on material progress and modernization, it is not difficult to understand this lack of interest in and sensitivity for the past. The nation
was rapidly expanding westward and the country looked ahead to the
new and better life of the future. Furthermore, if little attention was
given to the preservation of seventeenth and eighteenth century European settlements, even less was accorded to the remaining evidence of
pre-European civilization on the North American continent. During
the second half of the nineteenth century, the public considered the
American Indian to be a recently subjugated adversary whose unfamiliar lifeways and troublesome presence interfered with national development. It is not surprising that there was no widespread public
interest in preserving the culture of this defeated enemy.
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, scientific organizations were active in focusing the attention of the federal government
and the general public upon American archaeological resources. 18 Privately funded expeditions traveled to the Southwest to ascertain the
condition of the Indian ruins in that region. They discovered the si,es
16. T. KING, P. HICKMAN & G. BERG, ANTHROPOLOGY IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION 12-15
(1977).
17. At an early stage the courts upheld the use of eminent domain powers to permit federal
and state governments to acquire historic properties. In 1896, the United States Supreme Court
found that congressional action establishing the Gettysburg civil war battlefield site constituted a
valid exercise of federal eminent domain powers. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160
U.S. 668, 680 (1896). Federal action establishing the commemorative part, in the opinion of Justice Peckham, was clearly a valid public purpose upon which "there can be no well founded
doubt." I d. at 680. In 1929, relying upon the Gettysburg Electric case, the Court upheld a Kansas
statute permitting the use of state condemnation authority "for any tract or parcel of land in the
State of Kansas, which possess unusual historical interest." Roe v. Kansas ex rel Sinith, 278 U.S.
191, 193 (1929). Consequently, public authority to acquire culturally significant property through
eminent domain has been clear for many years.
18. R. LEE, THE ANTIQUITIES ACT OF 1906 1-12 {1970) {published by the National Park
Service, Washington, D.C.) (hereinafter cited as LEE.)
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had been seriously damaged by looters and vandals. 19 The reports
reaching the East were so disturbing that prominent archaeologists and
their sponsors approached both Congress and the Department of the
Interior as early as 1882 for assistance in protecting the imperiled sites
through reservation from public sale and preservation of artifacts. 20
Unfortunately, public support had not yet coalesced sufficiently to produce meaningful protective legislative action. Even at this early stage,
the conflicting goals of the conservationists and the interests favoring
unrestrained acquisition and use of the public domain were readily apparent. The issue remains with us today.Z 1 In the latter part of the
nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century, public
exposure to American archaeology was greatly expanded by museum
displays and other exhibitions of artifacts. With the rising interest in
Indian artifacts, however, came increased pothunting and damage to
sites. It was clear that the disturbing trends would have to be met by
federal action if the cultural resources of the nation were to be preserved.
After six years of consideration, Congress enacted the Antiquities
Act of 190622 in an effort to regulate the unauthorized looting of sites
having significant Indian artifacts and structures. As early as 1900, legislative proposals had been introduced in Congress directing the President to reserve selected archaeological sites and prohibiting the
unauthorized disturbance of archaeological resources. 23 A lack of con19. LEE, supra note 18, at 14-18.
20. Sen. Charles F. Hoar of Massachusetts presented a petition from the New England Historic Genealogical Society requesting Congress to withhold lands in the southwest from public
sale. Although the petition formally brought the question of antiquities protection before Congress, it did not arouse sufficient interest in the issue to save the matter from an anonymous death
in the Senate Committee on Public Lands. See 13 CoNG. REc. 3777 (1882).
21. In the present context, this conflict has materialized in the extraordinary effort expended
by Sen. Mike Gravel to limit the unlimited Presidential power-derived from the Antiquities Act,
16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976)-to declare national monuments, thereby removing them from development and use. See The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of1979: Hearings on S. 490 Before
the Subcomm. on Parks, Recreation, and Renewable Resources ofthe Senate Comm. on Energy and
Natural Resources, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 1, 137-45 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings];
125 CoNG. REC. Sl0,836-42 (daily ed. July 30, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Gravel). Sen. Gravel of
Alaska offered a bill-S. 1176-which would have amended the Antiquities Act to require congressional approval, by concurrent resolution, for withdrawls of more than 5,000 acres. S. 1176,
96th Cong., lst Sess., 125 CoNo. REc. Sl0,837 (daily ed. July 30, 1979). Sen. Gravel was concerned about the recent creation of 17 national monuments in Alaska totalling 56,000,000 acres.
National monument status removes those federal lands from oil and gas exploration. See 15
WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Docs. 151 (January 29, 1979). S. 1176 would have applied retroactively
to invalidate the Presidential declaration of Alaskan monuments. 125 CoNG. REc. Sl0,837 (daily
ed. July 30, 1979).
22. Pub. L. No. 34-209, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (current version codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431.
433 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
23. On February 5, 1900, Rep. Jonathan P. Dolliver of Iowa introduced a bill granting regulatory power to the Secretary of the Interior and creating a criminal sanction for unauthorized
excavations. H.R. 8066, 56th Cong., lst Sess., 33 CoNG. REC. 1529 (1900). The next day, Rep.
John F. Shafroth of Colorado submitted a bill which merely created the criminal sanction for
harming antiquities. H.R. 8195, 56th Cong., lst Sess., 33 CoNo. REc. 2637 (1900). On March 7,
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sensus both within and without Congress resulted in delay. During this
period of legislative inaction, federal land managers used their administrative authority to withdraw lands under their control from public
sale, settlement, or entry. This interim action served to temporarily
protect identified sites until more formal action could be taken. The
sites located in the southwestern portion of the nation, however, were
the most vulnerable due to the tremendous acreage under federal ownership, the concentration of significant sites within the region, and the
small number of federal officials available to supervise the federal
lands.
The 1906 Act, in direct terms, prohibited the appropriating, excavating, injuring, or destroying of any "historic or prehistoric ruin or
monument, or any object of antiquity, situated on lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States" without first obtaining permission from the federal land manager. 24 These terms were
never defined in the statute and, as a result, the enforcement of the
prohibitions would later be barred in one federal circuit court on constitutional grounds. 25 As a deterrent to the objectionable conduct, the
Act established a criminal penalty of up to five hundred dollars in fines
or ninety days imprisonment or both. 26 Congress anticipated the need
for expert examination and possible excavation of archaeological sites,
and allowed institutions "properly qualified" to undertake the task pursuant to a federal permit.27 Thus, as a matter of federal policy, as early
as 1906 archaeological resources were viewed as being important to the
nation and worth protecting with a federal regulatory system reinforced
by modest criminal law sanctions. In addition, the 1906 legislation
gave the President broad discretionary power to create national monuments by reserving lands on the public domain containing "liistoric
1900, he introduced a bill which went beyond his prior proposal and authorized the Secretary of
Interior to withdraw important sites of up to 320 acres to be placed in the custody of the Bureau of
American Ethnology of the Smithsonian Institution. H.R. 9245, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 33 CoNG.
REc. 2637 (1900). The Department of Interior, through Rep. John F. Lacey oflowa, offered H.R.
11021 on April 26, 1900, which would have vested that agency with broad power. H.R. 11021,
56th Cong., 1st Sess., 33 CoNG. REc. 4738 (1900). Rep. Shafroth responded to the Interior Department proposal with a considerably narrower bill. H.R. 10451, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 33 CoNG.
REC. 4738 (1900). These bills were followed by others but none were successful. Finally, archaeologist Edgar Lee Hewitt drafted a bill which, having the support of Rep. John F. Lacey and Sen.
Thomas M. Patteson, eventually became the 1906 Antiquities Act. See LEE, supra note 18, at 4777.

24. 16 u.s.c. § 433 (1976).
25. See United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974). But see United States v. Smyer,
596 F.2d 939 (lOth Cir. 1979).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). For a discussion of the civil and criminal penalties under the 1979 Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S. C. §§ 470aa-4701/ (Supp. III
1979), see text & notes 125-59 in.fra.
27. 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1976) (amended 1979). The administrative regulations issued under the
1906 Act defined "properly qualified" as "reputable museums, universities, colleges, or_other recognized scientific or educational institutions or their duly authorized agents." 43 C.F:R.~§ 3.3
(1979). See note 31 in.fra.
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landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures and other objects of historic or scientific interest."28 This power has been exercised to create at
least eighty-four29 such monuments and has been employed in such a
way as to foster serious discord between at least one state and the federal government. 30
Mter the 1906 Act was signed by President Theodore Roosevelt,
the federal bureauctacy began to address the problems involved in regulating archaeological resources situated on federal lands. Shortly after enactment, a brief set of administrative regulations was jointly
issued by the Secretaries of War, Agric~lture, and the Interior to implement the authority created by the Antiquities Act. 31 These rules provided that site examination and excavation would be available only to
a narrow group of experts, that each federal agency would monitor
ongoing work, and that the Smithsonian Institution would serve as
both an advisor on permit applications and a repository for the data
developed by permitted work. Each of the federal agencies with major
land management responsibilities was authorized to issue permits for
archaeological activities on lands under their administration. In the
three decades following the passage of the 1906 Act, however, the Department of the Interior emerged as the manager of federally owned
historic sites, parks, and monuments.
The Antiquities Act was the first and only federal law, until the
1979 Archaeological Resources Protection Act,3 2 to preserve archaeological sites and artifacts from the destructive actions of private individuals. Other statutes, executive orders, and administrative
regulations discussed below will illustrate the development of federal
policy controlling the potentially damaging impact of government actions upon cultural resources. 33 Even though it is an early recognition
of the importance of cultural values, the 1906 Act has proven inadequate to the task of protecting archaeological sites and artifacts. The
statute sought only to regulate resources located on federal land and
did not attempt to extend federal regulatory power to state or privately
28. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
29. See id.
30. See note 21 Sllpra.
31. LEE, Sllpra note 18, at 118-20. Formal regulations implementing the permitting functions
of the 1906 Act appear at 43 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.17 (1979). These brief regulations describe a permit
application process controlled by the Secretary having authority over the land in question. ld.
§§ 3.1, 3.3. The only external review to be accorded permit requests is to be performed by the
Smithsonian Institution. The regulations, however, specify no standards for evaluation. I d. § 3.8.
Although the 1979 Act requires a new set of regulations to effectuate the policy of the Act, no
federal agency has issued revised rules. The Departments of the Interior and Agriculture have
recently stated that they will continue to use the procedures of the existing regulations to implement the substantive policy of the new statute. 45 Fed. Reg. 13,433 (1980).
32. Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721 (1979) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470// (Supp. III
1979)).
33. See note 5 Sllpra.
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held property. As a matter of legal theory, the drafters of the Antiquities Act approached the problem of archaeological plunder more as a
question of federal land management than as a matter of cultural resource protection. The Act's regulatory function was made effective
through the potential imposition of judicial sanctions. By design, such
a system relied upon the issuance of permits and the supervision of
federal officials to ensure compliance. The vast expanse of territory
under federal control, the limited number of federal officials, and the
low priority given by the federal government to administrative responsibilities under the Antiquities Act all combined to reduce the usefulness of the statute. Finally, as time passed it became apparent that the
penalties provided for in the Act, coupled with its lax enforcement,34
did not act as a sufficient deterrent to potential violators of the law.
For nearly thirty years following the passage of the Antiquities Act
there was no federal legislative action for the protection of archaeological sites and objects. During that period, however, several significant
events occurred which influenced the course of cultural resource preservation. In the 1920s, with the substantial financial support of John D.
Rockefeller, Jr., the town of Williamsburg, Virginia was restored to its
pre-Revolutionary War condition as the capital of Virginia.35 This
project was important because it resulted in the development of improved archaeological field methods and also because it drew public
attention to the historic site and the careful restoration techniques employed. Next, the economic disaster of the 1930's ironically served to
bolster the federal government's role ln. surVeying and- salvaging historically and archaeologically significant properties. As part of its national recovery program, the administration of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt employed a large number of architects to undertake the Historic American Building Survey which preserved data concerning historic structures. Also, the Works Progress Administration [WPA] hired
a large number of unemployed persons to examine and excavate
archaeological sites. This work was conducted under the supervision of
the Smithsonian Institution and focused mainly upon the area of the
nation affected by the activities of the newly created Tennessee Valley
Authority. Under this program, archaeologists employed by the federal government engaged in a large-scale salvage operation, attempting
to rescue and remove significant archaeological remains before a devel34. This lack of enforcement is best reflected in the reference by Judge Merrill in United
States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974), that "[c]ounsel on neither side was able to cite any
instances prior to this in which conviction under the [1906] statute was sought by the United
States." I d. at 113-14.
35. T. KING, P. HICKMAN & G. BERG, supra note 16, at 21.
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opment project could destroy them. 36
In 1935, Congress passed the Historic Sites Act37 which expanded
federal cultural resources policy from the initial position taken by the
Antiquities Act twenty-nine years earlier. The 1935 statute declared
that it was the "national policy to preserve historic sites, buildings and
objects of national significance for the inspiration and benefit of the
people of the United States."38 By emphasizing the preservatic~m of historic and prehistoric sites, the Act apparently rejected the salvage approach embraced by the federally sponsored WPA program. The
Historic Sites Act was also significant because it accorded the National
Parks Service [NPS] of the Department of the Interior central authority
to carry out the federal government's program of historic and archaeological preservation.39 Specifically, the NPS was directed to survey and
examine such sites and to acquire pertinent documentary information
concerning those cultural assets.40 To achieve the purposes of the Act
the agency also was permitted to acquire "by gift, purchase, or otherwise" both real and personal property and to restore significant properties for the public's benefit.41 Possibly because of the fact that the
Williamsburg restoration project had been undertaken, there was considerable emphasis in the statute on encouraging the development of
historic or archaeological sites as public museums. Although the actual
accomplishments of the 1935 Act may have been more theoretical than
real, it did serve to reinforce the federal involvement in cultural resource protection and to focus the primary responsibility for federal
historic preservation activities in the Department of the Interior.
During the period immediately following World War II there was
little legislative activity in the area of cultural resources protection.42
In that era, however, federal developmental activities were rapidly expanding in number and scope. These activities often affected areas of
36. Compare this federal activity with that authorized under 16 U.S.C. § 469 (1976)
(amended 1979).
37. Act of August 21, 1935, 49 Stat. 666 (current version codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
38. I d. § 461 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
39. See id. § 462 (1976).
40. See id. § 462(a), (b).
41. I d. § 462(d). The holding in Gettysburg Electric would apparently permit federal condemnation in order to accomplish the purposes of the Act. See note 17 supra.
42. In 1949, Congress enacted legislation creating the National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States. 16 U.S.C. § 468 (1976). The Trust, established as a "charitable, educational, and nonprofit corporation," was expected to acquire through a variety of means "sites,
buildings and objects significant in American history or culture" and to undertake a preservation
program. I d. § 468(a). In part modeled after the British National Trust, the American organization was intended to supplement federal preservation efforts and to serve as the recipient of pri·
vate contributions that might never be made to the federal government. See Letter from J.A.
Krug, Secretary of Interior, to Rep. Hardin Peterson, Chairman House Committee on Public
Lands, reprinted in (1949] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 2287-88.
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archaeological significance.43 As a reaction to this expansion, federal
agencies began to require archaeological salvage operations as a component of their own or their funded operations. This trend was reflected in federal highway legislation44 and most notably in the
Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960.45 The 1960 Act provided for a system
of interagency notification and funding for salvage activities in the face
of federal dam construction that might "cause irreparable loss or destruction of significant scientific, prehistorical, historical, or archaeological data. . . ."46 The potential coverage of this survey and salvage
program was broadened in 1974 by the enactment of the Archeological
and Historical Preservation Act [AHPA] 47 which extended the prior
law to encompass "any alteration of the terrain caused as a result of
any Federal construction project or federally licensed activity or program."48 It is clear that the primary purpose of the federal program
authorized by these two statutes is the preservation of data by salvage
techniques rather than by agency project planning processes that are
sensitive to cultural resource protection and designed to avoid the use
of significant lands.49 This statutory action illustrates a partial accommodation made by Congress to the cultural interest. Funding 1s intended to lessen the destructive effects of developmental agency actions
43. The Senate committee report on H.R. 5170-the legislation establishing the National
Trust-aptly described the effect of the post-war developmental surge upon cultural properties:
Recent years have witnessed the neglect, destruction, and loss of a rapidly growing
number of the important historic sites and buildings of America. Some of these are
historic houses on the outskirts of expanding cities where modem industrial or real estate
developments engulf them. Other places, associated with great men and events, happen
to be in the way of highway, turnpike, or bridge construction. Still others, such as the
ancient Spanish trails of the Southeast, or the pioneer trails of the West, are being neglected and gradually forgotten.
S. REP. No. 1110, 8lst Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1949] U.S. CODE CoNG. & Ao. NEws 2285-86.
44. 23 U.S.C. § 305 (1976). This statute makes federal funding available as part of the highway project for survey and salvage work for archaeological and paleontological objects "having
National, State, or local historical or scientific significance. . . ." 23 C.P.R. 765.1 (1980). This
statute did not reflect a legislative attitude favoring the avoidance of such sites in project planning
but rather a funding system to support salvage activities.
45. Pub. L. No. 86-523, 74 Stat. 220 (1979) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 469-469c (1976 & Supp.
III 1979)).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 469a-l(a) (1976).
47. Act of May 24, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-29, 88 Stat. 174 (amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 469-469c
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 469 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The Heritage Conservation and Recreation
Service [HCRS] of the Department of the Interior issued a "statement of program approach"
regarding AHPA. See 44 Fed. Reg. 18,117-18 (1979). This statement explained that the intent of
AHPA "is to make authorized Federal construction programs and all projects licensed or assisted
by Federal agencies responsive to the damage they will cause to scientific, prehistoric, historic, and
archeological resources." Id. The HCRS announcement made clear that the 1974 Act did not
relieve federal agencies of their duties under the National Historical Preservation Act and Executive Order No. 11,593. Id. at 18,118.
49. HCRS: however, specifically noted in its program statement that "resource salvage generally is less preferable than preservation in situ. After identification of resources during the initial
planning stages of a project, Federal agencies should give full consideration to courses of action
that will not necessitate salvage." 44 Fed. Reg. 18,118 (1979). It is possible that the preservation
attitude has found an advocate within the Department of the Interior.
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by locating, identifying, and removing culturally significant items. The
preservation of the site itself, however, is not accomplished under this
approach.
The environmental movement of the late 1960's led to the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act [NEPA] 50 in 1969 and
greatly influenced the passage of a broad range of special environmentallaws51 and executive orders. Within the developing theory of environmental quality, cultural values were explicitly recognized as being a
component of the conception of a desirable quality of life. Many of the
protections available to environmental interests in general have been
extended to cultural resources. 52 The new environmental consciousness also regenerated an interest in older laws that previously had little
or no effect on federal programs. These laws have recently regained
vitality due to legislative amendments and new judicial interpretations.53 The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 [NHPA] 54 is a
prime example of this development and potentially one of the most
important federal statutes.
NHPA established the National Register of Historic Places. 55
Most importantly, the Act required all federal agencies to consult with
the newly created Advisory Council on Historic Preservation whenever
federal projects might have adverse impacts on historic or archaeological sites listed on the National Register. 56 Executive Order No.
50. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976)).
51. 16 U.S.C. § 661 (1976) (Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act); 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976)
(Endangered Species Act); 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1976) (Wild and Scenic Rivers Act).
52. The most obvious protection is the inclusion of cultural resource issues within the environmental impact statement required under NEPA. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060 (8th Cir. 1977); Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 565 F.2d 549 (9th
Cir. 1977); Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Robinson v.
Knebel, 550 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1977); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d
1292 {8th Cir. 1976).
53. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 {1978}, reflects this phenomenon. See W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW§ 7.12, at 822-34 (1977); Rosenberg & Olson, Federal Environmental Review Requirements Other Than NEPA: The Emerging Challenge, 21 Ct.EV. ST. L. REV. 195, passim (1978).
54. Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (current version codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1976
& Supp. III 1979)}. The Act has been amended several times. Act of Aug. 18, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-383, 84 Stat. 825; Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-422, 90 Stat. 1313; Act of Oct. 7, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-458, 90 Stat. 1939.
55. 16 U.S.C. § 470a (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976 & Supp. III 1979). This subsection would seem to apply to both
detrimental and beneficial effects of federal actions. Section 470f provides:
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the head of any Federal
department or independent agency having authority to license any undertaking shall,
prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior
to the issuance of any license, as the case may be, take into account the ejfrcl of the
undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. The head of any such Federal agency shall
afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation established under sections 470i to
470t of this title a reasonable opportunity to co=ent with regard to such undertaking.
Id. (emphasis added).
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11,593,57 issued in 1971, was interpreted by the Advisory Council to
expand the authority of the 1966 Act to include properties eligible for
listing on the National Register of Historic Places. This order provided eligible properties the same protection accorded properties actually listed on the Register. In 1976, NHPA was amended to formally
extend the protections of the Act to such eligible properties, 58 and thus
the statutory authority was brought in line with the existing Executive
Order. The 1966 Act created a system of federal interagency review
which was intended, at a minimum, to force federal agencies to address
the question of cultural resource impact prior to acting.
The full impact of the Act and Executive Order began to be felt
after the Advisory Council issued regulations for carrying out the Act
and the Order in early 1974.59 In short, the Advisory Council procedures require that a federal agency consult a State Historic Preservation Officer [SHPO] when determining how its activities will affect
historic or archaeological sites.60 The procedures require that the
SHPO, along with the Advisory Council and the interested federal
agency, reach written agreement in certain cases on how to mitigate
any adverse effects expected from a federal project. 61 The Advisory
Council procedures also contain minimum review periods which can
cause delays for various federal projects. For instance, the Advisory
Council may take thirty days to review a "no adverse effect'' determination made by a federal agency. 62 This review follows the required
survey activities, consultations with the SHPO, and a determination of
eligibility for the National Register of Historic Places by the Heritage
Conservation and Recreation Service. 63
The National Historic Preservation Act and Advisory Council procedures have placed a significant additional obligation upon federal
agencies. An increasing number of cases have been brought alleging
damage to cultural interests and violations of NEPA, NHPA, or both.64
57. Exec. Order No. 11,593, 3 C.F.R. 154 (1971), reprinted in 16 U.S.C. § 470 app., at 429
(1976).
58. Pub. L. No. 94-422, § 201(3), 90 Stat. 1320 (1976) (amending 16 U.S. C. § 470f (1976 &
Supp. III 1979)).
59. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.1-800.15 (1979). On October 25, 1978, the Advisory Council proposed extensive amendments to thse regulations. 43 Fed. Reg. 50,650-60 (1978). These modifications were intended to simplify Advisory Council co=enting procedures and streamline the
entire process. On January 30, 1979, the Advisory Council issued its final regulations which modified the previous proposal. 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.1-800.15 (1979).
60. 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.4(a), {b), 800.5 (1979). Strict time limits are imposed upon the SHPO,
and if no response to a request for his opinion is received within 30 days, concurrence is presumed. Id. § 800.5(a), (b).
61. Id. § 800.6(c).
62. Id. § 800.6(a).
63. Eligibility for listing is determined in conjunction with the standards established in id.
§§ 63 and 800.4(a)(3).
64. E.g., WATCH v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1979); District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic
Ass'ns v. Adams, 571 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir. 1978).
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By itself, NEPA requires that agencies evaluate the impacts of their
activities on cultural as well as natural and ecological resources. 65
NHPA, as implemented through the Advisory Council procedures,
often requires investigations and documentation for cultural resource
impacts beyond those required by NEPA. 66 These additional requirements may be particularly onerous from the agency's viewpoint when
archaeological properties are involved. Archaeological properties eligible for the National Register are found in many areas of the country,
and their presence and precise location usually cannot be detected
without extensive field surveys that often involve subsurface excavation.
As a matter of policy development, NHPA and its related administrative rules reflect a further recognition of cultural resource values.
The Act imposes a consultation and review requirement upon all federal agencies which is intended to induce them to plan their actions in
such a way as not to harm historic or archaeologically significant
properties. Although cultural interests are not accorded a uniform position of priority over all other social values, NHPA does enforce a
procedure which demands serious consideration of any harmful effects.
As a regulator of federal agency behavior, the 1966 Act is of extreme
importance.
THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES PROTECTION ACT OF 1979
The increasing frequency of looting incidents at archaeological
sites during the 1970s brought the issue of the adequacy of federal legal
protections before Congress. A number of criminal prosecutions arising from alleged violations of the 1906 Antiquities Act had resulted in
conflicting judicial interpretations of the law. 67 In 1974, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. .Dia/'8 declared the criminal penalty provisions
65. 42 U.S.C. § 433l(b)(4) (1976). This section states that one element of national policy will
be to "preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and
maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual
choice." Id.
66. Newly issued amendments to the Advisory Council's regulations address the question of
NEPA compliance. 36 C.F.R. § 800.9 (1979). These new regulations suggest that agencies should
coordinate their NEPA and NHPA review processes, although at the same time flatly state that the
two statutes are "independent." The newly issued Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations concerning federal EIS preparation direct that NEPA compliance should be combined
with other statutory requirements ''to the fullest extent possible." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.25 (1979). In
the statement of policy, NEPA regulations direct federal agencies "to the fullest extent possible" to
"[i]ntegrate the requirements ofNEPA with other planning and environmental review procedures
required by law or by agency practice so that all such procedures run concurrently rather than
consecutively." I d.§ 1500.2(c) (1979). AlthoiJgh the language employed seems more fitting in the
criminal law context, the intention is clearly to streamline all federal environmental review.
67. Compare United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 {lOth Cir. 1979) with United States v.
Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
68. 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
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of the Act to be unconstitutionally vague69 and invalidated the statute
in the states comprising the judicial circuit.70 It was clear, however,
that the existing penalties provided by the Antiquities Act, even if judicially upheld, were totally inadequate to deter those who were damaging archaeological sites and pilfering artifacts. 71 Since cultural
resources had become extremely valuable on the domestic and international art market,72 the weak penalties, which were rarely imposed,
were undoubtedly viewed by the profit-motivated looters as merely a
cost of doing business. This lack of an effective legal sanction, when
combined with the tremendous area to be supervised, created a serious
threat to the future of America's cultural resources. 73
As in 1906, agitation for legislative reform originated in scientific
journals.74 The frustration engendered by the .Diaz decision and the
consensus of opinion that a statutory change was necessary prompted
Congress to enact a new law within a period of nine months.75 This
expedited treatment of the archaeological resource protection bill reflected a common perception that immediate action was warranted.
The accelerated consideration and impressive support for the legislation, however, did mask at least one significant controversy involving
the Antiquities Act-the unfettered Presidential power to declare national monuments upon federallands. 76 Leaving that issue aside, Congress was willing to address itself to the task of developing a new
regulatory program for the control of archaeological exploration and
recovery on federal lands. Throughout the congressional deliberations
on the proposed statute a tension existed between those who advocated
a legal system providing the maximum protection for archaeological
69. Id. at 115.
70. The Ninth Circuit includes Arizona, California, Nevada, Idaho, Oregon, Washington,
and Montana. United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (lOth Cir. 1979), however, had validated the
Antiquities Act in the Tenth Circuit. That circuit is comprised of New Mexico, Colorado, Utah,
Oklahoma, Kansas, and Wyoming. The split of opinion between these two judicial circuits was
especially significant since a great number of archaeological sites are located in the latter six states.
71. See text & note 26 supra. The first reported challenge to the constitutionality of the Act
occurred in Diaz. See text and notes 67-70 supra.
72. Collins & Green, A Proposal to Modernize the American Antiquities Act, 202 SCIENCE
1055, 1058-59 (1978).
73. The entire group of witnesses who testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Parks,
Recreation, and Renewable Resources of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
adopted that position concerning S. 490. Although differing slightly on specific provisions, the
supportive consensus was clear. Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 1-96.
74. E.g., Collins & Green, supra note 72.
75. The House bill, H.R. 1825, was introduced on February 1, 1979, by Rep. Morris K. Udall
of Arizona and nine other co-sponsors. H.R. REP. No. 311, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 7, reprinted in
(1979] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1709, 1709-28 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. The
Senate bill, S. 490, was introduced on February 26, 1979, by Sen. Pete V. Domenici of New Mexico and four co-sponsors. S. REP. No. 179, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT]. The legislation was signed into law on October 31, 1979, as Pub. L. No. 96-95,
93 Stat. 721.
76. See text & notes 2, 21 supra.
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resources and others who wished to maintain a high level of unrestricted public use of federal lands. The resolution of this conflict is
amply reflected in the enacted legislation.
The Permitting Process
The 1979 Act places primary emphasis upon a federal permit program to control the disturbance of sites located on federal lands having
archaeological significance. This permitting procedure must be considered in combination with the civil and criminal sanctions77 provided
for in the Act in order to comprehend the emerging congressional protective policy regarding cultural resources. These sanctions will be discussed below. Under the permit program, an organization or an
individual wishing to "excavate or remove any archaeological resource
located on public lands or Indian lands"78 must obtain formal permission from the local federal land manager. Consequently, the acts of
excavating and removing archaeological resources and undertaking activities associated with those actions give rise to the need for a permit.79
In an effort to avoid a constitutional attack based upon vagueness,
as in .Diaz,80 the statute explicitly defines a number of important terms
so as to leave no doubt when a permit is required. 81 Any "person" may
obtain a permit. 82 The term "person" is broadly defined to include not
only private individuals and organizations but also anyone acting for
77. See text & notes 125-59 infra.
78. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(a) (Supp. III 1979). The statute specifically states:
(A]ny person may apply to the Federal land manager for a permit to excavate or remove
any archaeological resource located on public lands or Indian lands and to carry out
activities associated with such excavation or removal. [Such an application must] contain such information as the Federal land manager deems necessary, including information concerning the time, scope, and location and specific purpose of the proposed work.
I d. The language of this provision should have more clearly indicated the mandatory nature of
the application by using the word shall. The failure to procure such a permit could lead to the
imposition of significant sanctions. See 16 U.S. C.§ 470ee (Supp. III 1979).
79. It will be extremely important to draft the permits with specificity so that authorized
parties do not cause more damage with their associated activities than they do with permitted
excavation and removal. Also, actions in contravention of permit requirements can give rise to
criminal and civil penalties. See 16 U.S. C. §§ 470ee, 470ff (Supp. III 1979). To be enforceable,
the permit requirements would have to be well defined. The existing Antiquities Act regulations
do not specify the composition of a permit or the acts which give rise to the need for one. See
generally 43 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.17 (1979). Under these regulations, a permit may be used for up to
three years, requires annual reporting of results to the Smithsonian Institution, and may be terminated at the discretion of the federal land manager. I d. §§ 3.6, 3.10, 3.12.
80. 499 F.2d at I 13-14 (9th Cir. 1974).
81. See 16 U.S.C. § 470bb (Supp. III 1979). It is curious that the terms "excavate" and "remove" are left undefined by the statute. These terms may be defined by the interagency regulations mandated by the Act or by the courts. See id. § 470ii. Reflecting the political importance of
federal regulatory action regarding public lands management and archaeology, the Act requires
that all regulations issued pursuant thereto do not become effective for ninety days, during which
time specified congressional committees may review their potential effect. Id.
82. There is but one exception to the obligation to secure such permission. The statute c;xplicitly allows a member of an Indian tribe to excavate or remove an archaeological resource
without a federal permit if it is located upon that person's tribal lands. The act must be undertaken pursuant to "tribal law regulating the excavation or removal of archaeological resources on
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the federal, state or local governments, or an Indian tribe. 83 Theoretically, any group or individual meeting the statutorily mandated tests
could receive a permit to excavate. As noted above, a permit is necessary for excavation and removal of items on federal lands but only
when there is an "archaeological resource" involved. Excavation and
removal of objects not coming within that classification might be regulated by other regulations or statutes, 84 but not by the Archaeological
Resources Protection Act of 1979. As a result, the entire regulatory and
enforcement system is activated by the existence of such an "archaeological resource." The Act defines an archaeological resource as "any
material remains of past human life or activities which are of archaeological interest as determined under uniform regulations. . . .''85 A
number of categories of artifacts and structures have been specifically
provided by statute to serve as the foundation of the administrative
definition. As a matter of legislative policy, all archaeological resources must be at least one hundred years old. 86 In an attempt to
avoid the constitutional infirmity of vagueness which resulted in the
invalidation of the criminal sanction of the 1906 Antiquities Act, the
new statute adds significant detail to the essential sta.tutory term.
Finally, the new federal law only regulates activities occurring on
federally owned or Indian lands87 located in the fifty states, the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. 88 There is no
Indian lands." In the absence of such regulations, federal law and procedure applies. 16 U.S.C.
§ 470cc (Supp. III 1979).
83. See id. § 470bb. Due to the fact that the Act provides for a federal rather than a state
permitting function, the sovereign immunity issues discussed in Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167
(1976), are not present. See note 31 supra.
84. See 125 CoNG. REc. Sl4,722 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield). The
Ninth Circuit recently held that in spite of its ruling in JJiaz invalidating the criminal enforcement
provisions of the 1906 Antiquities Act, the government may charge those who steal or damage
artifacts on federal lands with violation of general criminal statutes. United States v. Jones, 607
F.2d 269, 271 (9th Cir. 1979). See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976) (theft of government property), and id.
§ 1361 (depredation of government property).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb (Supp. III 1979). Although not specifically cross-indexed in the statute, the agency definition of the term "archaeological resource" is apparently a joint decision of
the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, and Defense and the Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority after consulting with a variety of interest groups. See id. § 470ii. It is questionable
whether such a group of land management agencies will agree on an expansive or highly protective definition of the term.
86. Originally the Senate bill-S. 490-had required an "archaeological resource" to be but
fifty years old. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 2. During the Conference Committee's
deliberations, the Senate conferees acceded to the House position requiring an object to be at least
one hundred years old. See 125 CoNG. REc. S14,721 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1979) (remarks of Sen.
Bumpers). As a result of the committee's efforts, the language used to define "archaeological
resource" was substantially improved. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 470bb (Supp. III 1979) with H.R.
1825, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(1), 125 CONG. REC. H5509 (daily ed. July 9, 1979) andS. 490, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(a), 125 CoNG. REc. Sl0,830 (daily ed. July 30, 1979).
87. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb (Supp. III 1979).
88. Id. § 470cc. The comments provided by the Department of the Interior concerning H.R.
1825 and S. 490 suggested the inclusion of American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands. See HousE REPORT, supra note 75, at 17; SENATE REPORT, supra note
75, at 15. This recommendation was not heeded.
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attempt to extend any federal control over destructive practices taking
place on state or privately owned land. 89 In fact, the statute specifically
exempts those areas from coverage. 90 Regulation in this sphere, if it is
ever to come, must originate with the state or local level of government
under a subfederal basis of authority. Without state or local control, a
private landowner is free to excavate and remove artifacts without any
governmental intervention. Since a large number of archaeologically
significant properties are located in the Southwest where federal land
ownership is extensive, this gap in federal regulation may not be a serious defect in the protective plan.
The statute specifies two broad categories of lands to which the
permit requirement attaches: public lands and Indian lands. Public
lands are comprised of the national park system, the national wildlife
refuge system, the national forest system, and "all other lands the fee
title to which is held by the United States. . . .'' 91 In addition, for purposes of the Act, Indian lands are defined to mean "lands of Indian
tribes, or Indian individuals, which are either held in trust by the
United States or subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by
the United States... .'' 92 Although there are a number of definitional
89. See 16 U.S.C. § 470kk (Supp. III 1979). Throughout the development of this legislation
there was never any effort to create a general regulatory statute empowering a federal agency to
protect archaeological sites wherever they are found. At most, this legislation was viewed as nec·
essary and reasonable federal land management authority infringing as little as possible on the
public's use of federal land. See 125 CoNG. REc. H5512 (daily ed. July 9, 1979) (remarks of Rep.
Udall); 125 CoNG. REc. H9088 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Lagomarsino).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 470k(c) (Supp. III 1979).
91. I d. § 470bb(3) (Supp. III 1979). The definition of public lands curiously exempts two
categories of property which otherwise would be covered by the Act: lands on the Outer Continental Shelf [OCS], and lands under the jurisdiction of the Smithsonian Institution. /d. It would
seem as though some federal regulation of the OCS lands would be advisable in light of the
common discovery of valuable and historically significant shipwrecks. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors,
Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 1978).
The Fifth Circuit held in this case that the remains of the Spanish vessel Nuestro Senora de Atocha
which was sunk off of the Florida coast in 1622 were "not situated on lands owned or controlled
by the United States under the provisions of the Antiquities Act." /d. at 340. This ruling made
the existing 1906 Act's protections unavailable in the Continental Shelf area beyond the three mile
limit. The "territorial waters" or "marginal sea" within this three mile boundary, while seemingly
within the control of the riparian states under the authority of the Submerged Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1343 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), are also not covered by the Antiquities Act. See
United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 524-25 (1975). With the 1979 Archaeological Resources
Protection Act, the existing state of federal nonregulation is continued. Under the holding in
Treasure Salvors, the ownership of recovered sunken treasure is guided by the "American rule"
according title to the finder. 569 F.2d at 343.
92. 16 U.S. C.§ 470bb(4) (Supp. III 1979). As enacted, this subsection contained a clause that
had not previously appeared in either the House or Senate drafts. The new language excepted
from the definition of "Indian lands" any "subsurface interest in lands not owned or controlled by
an Indian tribe or an Indian individual." /d. It is unclear what the effect of this provision will be.
The only congressional discussion of the changed language appears in Rep. Udall's floor statement explaining the conference report. He merely stated that " 'Indian' lands, is redefined to
protect non-Indian owners of subsurface rights." 125 CoNG. REc. H9088 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1979)
(remarks of Rep. Udall) (emphasis added). This would exempt subsurface owners of lands with
surface Indian ownership from compliance with the Act while possibly subjecting the Indian surface owners to full compliance and potential liability. This is apparently a last-minute special
interest provision.
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questions left unresolved, 93 the apparent intent of Congress was to
bring within the coverage of the Act large portions of the United States
under federal ownership or control.
Statutory Tests for Granting Permits

When one wishes to undertake excavation, removal, or related activities involving an archaeological resource located on federal land, a
permit must be secured from the federal land manager having authority over the particular site. 94 The Act clearly specifies that the "Federal
land manager" is to be the Secretary of the Department or the head of
any other agency having primary management authority over the land
involved.95 The Act does not specify whether the permit program is to
be administered locally or in the headquarters of the land management
agency. It seems likely that the permits will be issued under a framework created by regulations96 in a decentralized system with a degree
of supervision by the Washington-based agency office.
An applicant must meet four statutorily mandated tests in order to
be eligible for a permit. First, it must be shown that the applicant is
"qualified" to carry out the proposed activity.97 This requirement
93. One unresolved question invo.lves the classification of private or state lands within an
Indian reservation or within the boundaries of a public land parcel. The legislative history in the
House demonstrates an intent to exclude these lands from coverage. See HousE REPORT, supra
note 75, at 8.
94. Since the statute describes the permit-granting decision in discretionary rather than
mandatory language, it is possible that a permit could be denied even if all four statutory tests, see
notes 97-107 i'!fra, are met. See note 78 supra. The Act states that "a permit may be issued
pursuant to an application under subsection (a) if the Federal land manager determines [that the
statutory requirements have been met]." 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b) (Supp.III 1979). It is possible that
additional requirements could be imposed. In fact, the existing regulations under the 1906 Act
require permittees "to restore lands upon which they have worked to their customary condition, to
the satisfaction of the field officer in charge." 43 C.F.R. § 3.11 (1979).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(2) (Supp. III 1979). If there is no agency with "primary management
authority" then the Department of the Interior is to serve as the Federal land manager. Permitting
responsibilities can also be delegated to the Secretary of the Interior by federal agencies. I d.
96. Uniform rules and regulations governing the administration of the Act are to be jointly
developed by the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, and Defense, and the Chairman of the Board
of the Tennessee Valley Authority. See note 31 supra. Each Federal land manager, however,
must issue independent regulations "consistent with the uniform rules and regulations." 16 U.S.C.
§ 470ii(b) (Supp. III 1979). No rules of any kind have presently been proposed or formally issued.
The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources had noted with reference to the identical § 10 requirements present in S. 490 that "[i]t is the intent of the Committee that uniform
regulations be developed as expeditiously as possible. However, it should be noted that basic
agreement should be reached among the departments prior to publication of proposed uniform
regulations by any one department." SENATE REPORT, supra note 75, at II. This latter comment
may foreshadow internal policy conflicts among the major land management agencies.
97. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). The precise nature of requisite qualifications is
uncertain since there was no discussion of the issue in the legislative debates. The Senate hearings
on S. 490, however, yield some insight into this question. Dr. Ernest A. Connally, Associate Director of the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service [HCRS] of the Department of the
Interior, in response to a question posed by Senator Bumpers of Arkansas, noted:
[The new law] would change the definition somewhat, and would allow qualified persons
rather than just institutions as such to do it. So that it would include, for example, State
Historical Preservation Officers or other people who are qualified and might have the
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could force the archaeological professional organizations to license or
certify their members in order to make them eligible for work on federal lands. In the absence of formal professional certification, some
minimal level of experience and training should be required to ensure
high quality work. In addition, the permit request must describe the
proposed work to enable the federal official to assess the applicant's
technical competence to complete the project in a professional fashion.
The Act has substantially expanded the range of persons and organizations allowed to excavate archaeological properties. 98
Under the second statutory requirement, the proposed activity
must be "undertaken for the purpose of furthering archaeological
knowledge in the public interest." 99 This unquestionably reserves authorized exploration on federal lands for noncommercial purposes.
The nation's cultural resources should be disturbed only for the advancement of scientific knowledge and public understanding.
Third, the archaeological resources removed from the site remain
the property of the United States. These items, along with associated
archaeological records and data, must be preserved by a suitable insitution. 100 This test reiterates the position that artifacts found on federal
land are a national resource unavailable for private ownership. 101 It
emphasizes the importance of preserving not only the artifact itself, but
also the scientific data derived~ in the course of the investigation of the
site. This third test reflects the policy that federal lands are available to
appropriate investigators for exploration and removal of important material remains of prior cultures. Nowhere in the statute is there evidence of congressional support for a preservation-oriented theory
favoring the protection of significant sites whether examined or undisfinancial means of a private individual, say a philanthropist. [The bill] would give him
the opportunity . . . to go in for an investigation wilh proper scientific personnel and
equipment . . . ralher !han limit . . . [exploration] as strictly as we do at the present time
to educational or scientific institutions and professional organizations and associations
linked to recognized institutions.
Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 53. See id. at 56.
98. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1976) (amended 1979) with id. §§ 470bb(6), 470cc(a). See 43
C.F.R. § 3.3 (1979).
99. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
100. I d. § 470cc(b)(3). There may be difficulty in keeping !he artifac!S and the related data
physically togelher since archaeological resources may be transferred between universities, muse·
ums, or olher institutions. The Act invites !he Secretary of !he Interior to develop regulations
governing bolh !he custodial responsibilities of !he keeper of resources found after enactment and
the transfer of such resources to olher institutions. I d. § 470dd(l). It also reques!S Interior De·
partment rules governing !he "ultimate disposition" of bolh newly discovered items and those
found under prior aulhorities. I d. § 470dd(2). The meaning of this provision is unclear. In all
cases where archaeological resources are taken from Indian lands, !he consent of !he Indian or
Indian tribe owning !he l::nd or having jurisdiction must be received before it can be transferred.
Id. §470dd.
101. See 43 C.F.R. § 3.17 (1979).
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turbed. In this subtle way, the 1979 Act may encourage the destruction
of sites in order to preserve particular artifacts.
Fourth, the work plan proposed for federal permitting must not be
"inconsistent with any management plan" applicable to the land involved. 102 This provision clearly subordinates the permitting of
archaeological sites to the multiple-use activities which are presently
conducted on federal lands. In effect, a permit proposal may not be
granted if it will interfere with another use of the land such as grazing,
mining, oil and gas exploration, forestry, or land reclamation. Congress wished to make certain that the protective purposes of the Act to
regulate archaeological site exploration and excavation and to deter
commercially motivated looters would not be used to impose additional restrictions or review requirements on developmental activity. 103
For this reason, the permitting procedure was statutorily freed from
NHPA review requirements. 104 On the other hand, the language of the
1979 Act 105 does not exempt any multiple use activity from the preexisting legal and regulatory obligations that may independently require consideration of cultural resource interests in project planning. 106
Of special importance is the fact that these multiple-use activities
would remain subject to the specialized review required by section 106
ofNHPA. 107
By meeting these four threshold tests, and any other requirements
considered necessary by the land manager, a permit for the investigation of a potentially significant archaeological site may be granted. It is
possible that separate permits could be issued for different stages of the
102. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b)(4) (Supp. III 1979).
103. The House Committee report, however, referred to the fourth test as one which would
result in the preservation of potentially significant sites by denying the opportunity to explore. Ii
stated:
This section [16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b)(4)] is included with recognition that the science of
archaeology, in the modem sense, is as much concerned with the conservation and protection of archaeological resources "in situ" as it is with the excavation and removal of
specified archaeological resources. The protection of the integrity of an archaeological
site is extremely important in that the scientific value to society . . . may be enhanced by
not altering archaeological sites.
HousE REPORT, supra note 73, at 9. See note 49 supra. This estimate of effect is based upon the
questionable assumption that multiple-use activities will ilot result in disruption of significant
archaeological sites. See 125 CoNG. R.Ec. H5513 (daily ed. July 9, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Clausen); 125 CoNG. REc. H9089 (daily ed. October 12, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Lagomarsino).
104. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(i) (Supp. III 1979). The reference is to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation review procedures pursuant to id. § 470f.
105. See 16 U.S.C. § 470kk(a) (Supp. III 1979), which states: ''Nothing in this Act shall be
construed to repeal, modify, or impose additional restrictions on the activities permitted under
existing laws and authorities relating to mining, mineral leasing, reclamation, and other multiple
uses of the public lands."
106. See note 5 supra.
107. The regulations issued by the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation implement the
authority of§ 106 ofNHPA and 16 U.S.C. §A70f (Supp. III 1979) and make clear the broad range
of federal and federally related actions for which an evaluation of effect must be made under the
mandated review process. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c) (1979).
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exploration, excavation, and artifact removal process in order to maintain close supervision of the activity. The land manager retains the
power to either suspend or revoke any permit. 108 A suspension is authorized when the federal officer determines that the permittee has
committed a criminal violation prohibited by the Act. 109 Revocation,
which appears to be more permanent and serious, occurs when the permittee has been formally convicted of a criminal act or administratively
assessed a civil penalty. The 1979 Act specifies no procedural mechanism for exercising these punitive powers, although broad discretion
would probably be upheld due to the seriousness of the threatened
harm. In this way, the Act provides potential administrative control
over the parties granted permits.
Congress attempted to integrate the American Indian's interest
into the permitting process in several ways. The Act prohibits issuance
of a permit for work to be conducted upon Indian lands without the
prior consent of the Indian tribe or individual owning or having jurisdiction over the land. This effectively provides Indians with a veto
power over proposals to investigate sites on Indian lands. In this fashion, the Act recognizes the legitimate interest of American Indians
whose ancestral dwellings, possessions, and remains are often the subject of archaeological interest. 110 In addition, the land manager is required to give prior notification to the pertinent Indian tribes when a
permitting proposal could result in "harm to, or destruction of, any
religious or cultural site," even if that site is not on Indian lands. 111
This notice requirement, although superficially reasonable, will probably be difficult to administer due to the lack of knowledge on the part
of the federal land manager of the existence and location of such revered sites.U 2 The Act does not specify which legal recourse the noti108. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(f) (Supp. III 1979).
109. It is not certain that sufficient federal personnel exist to supervise the archaelogical sites
and that those officers available will be adequately trained to recognize a permit violation.
110. See 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(g)(2) (Supp. III 1979). The only representative of the American
Indian's interests who testified at Senate hearings on S. 490-Mr. Leroy Wilder, General Counsel
of the Association on American Indian Affairs-stressed the need for such a veto power not only
for sites on Indian lands but also for sites located outside Indian lands that are of religious, cultural, or historical significance to the Indians. Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 93-94.
111. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(c) (Supp. III 1979). In the Senate hearings, Mr. Wilder emphasized the
fact that an archaeological excavation project on Indian lands could exhume not-too-distant ancestors of living Indians. This, he believed, was especially true with the fifty-year time limit within
the definition of an "archaeological resource" originally inS. 490. Senate Hearings, supra note 21,
at 93.
112. See 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(c) (Supp. III 1979). In spite of the mandatory language employed
in this section of the statute imposing a general notification duty upon the federal land manager,
the House debate on this section reflects the intent that the disclosure obligation attach only to
known sites. There is no "positive duty" on the part of the Secretary of the Interior to be "independently aware" of sites having religious significance. See 125 CoNo. REc. H5513 (daily ed.
July 9, 1979) (remarks of Reps. Clausen and Udall).
Moreover, Indian tribes might be reluctant to specify sites of religious significance to federal
officials for fear that the information would be misused and would result in the destruction, not
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fied tribes may take and what the effect of a failure to notify will be. It
is an open question whether the administrative regulations to be issued
pursuant to the Act will allow the notified Indian tribes to contest the
permit application.
Miscellaneous Permitting Issues

The 1979 Act clearly states that permits issued under the authority
of the 1906 Antiquities Act remain in force and that no other approval
under the new Act is needed to pursue the previously authorized activity.113 Any modification of the previously approved undertaking would
apparently require a new permit under the 1979 Act. A more interesting question concerns whether or not the Act effectively repeals major
portions of the 1906 Antiquities Act. The new statute does not explicitly indicate that a repeal of the prior law has been achieved but it does
state that no permit under the Antiquities Act "shall be required . . .
for any activity for which a permit is issued under this section." 114
This, in practical effect, dooms the prior Act if the decision in .Diaz has
not already done so. The 1979 Act updates and strengthens the federal
law relating to archaeological sites and artifacts and provides a much
broader range of enforcement tools than did the earlier law. As a matter of legislative drafting, the 1979 Act should have specifically
amended the Antiquities Act repealing redrafted sections so as to avoid
any future confusion. 115
The 1979 Act grants a preferential status to state Governors who
seek a permit for the purposes of "archaeological research, excavation,
removal, and curation, on behalf of the State or its educational instituthe preservation, of such places. Congress was concerned about the danger of this locational data
being obtained by commercial looters through the Freedom of Information Act [FOIA]. Section 9
of the 1979 Act exempts this type of information from FOIA but permits its disclosure under
limited circumstances. 16 U.S.C. § 470hh (Supp. III 1979).
113. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(h)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
114. I d. § 470cc(h)(l ). The Senate Report on S. 490 reveals the formal position of the Senate
committee preparing the bill that "no changes in existing law are made by the bill S. 490 as
reported." SENATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 20. This statement is obviously false and appears
motivated by political interests. See note 115 infta. The Supreme Court recently held in TVA v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), that finding a statutory repeal implied in subsequent legislation is clearly
disfavored. I d. at 189 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)). Under this rule of construction, confusion will certainly result from Congress' failure to indicate repeal of the 1906 Act.
115. The apparent reason for avoiding a direct amendment to the 1906 Antiquities Act was a
political controversy centering on the President's power to withdraw lands from the public domain
and declare them national monuments. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The recent
exercise of that authority had sufficiently antagonized the Alaskan congressional delegation so
that they attempted to have the Antiquities Act amended to restrict this unbounded executive
power. See note 21 supra. In an effort to separate the politically charged issue ofland withdrawal
power from the relatively noncontroversial questions surrounding artifact protection, the congressional drafting committees asserted that the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 did
not amend the 1906 Act. By so doing, the land withdrawal issue could not be raised to slow the
progress of the critical protection legislation.
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tions.
" 116 Several of the obligations imposed on other permit applicants are waived when the Governor of a state files an application. 117
It is significant to note that the federal land manager is accorded discretionary authority to grant a permit in the case of a nonstate applicant
but is confronted with a mandatory duty if the statutory requisites are
met by a state applicant. 118 This provision not only accords a state
Governor a position of priority, but it also allows the Governor to designate a party to receive a permit without being subject to as close an
evaluation as would otherwise be required. 119 Most importantly, the
statute attempts to preclude the federal land manager from including in
any permit granted to a Governor or his designee any "terms and conditions" governing the conduct of the work at the archaeological site. 120
Therefore, the performance conditions that would normally be contained in a permit may not be imposed. This will effectively free the
state and its designees from federal supervision even though the activities are pursued on federal lands. Furthermore, the federal powers to
revoke an outstanding permit and to seek civil penalties for permit violations may also be lost. 121 Although this provision recognizes a state's
interest in federal and Indian lands within its borders, it creates the
116. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(j) (Supp. III 1979). The provision originated in the House bill, see note
75 supra, and was adopted by the Senate in the conference co=ittee. The Senate had not differ·
entiated between types of permit applicants in S. 490. See 125 CoNo. REc. Sl4,721 (daily ed.
October 17, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Bumpers).
117. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(j) (Supp. III 1979). The first two elements of the general permitting
test are eliminated. These are the requirements that the applicant is qualified to do the work and
that the work is undertaken to further archaeological knowledge in the public interest. /d.
§ 470cc(b)(I), (2).
118. The general permit granting authority contained in the Act is framed in discretionary
language. See note 94 supra. When a state Governor applies, however, the permit "shall issue"
subject to most of the same requirements imposed upon nongovernmental applicants. 16 U.S.C.
§ 470cc(j) (Supp. III 1979). The House report on H.R. 1825 stated: "Upon such request [from the
Governor], the Federal land manager shall issue a permit." HousE REPORT, supra note 75, at 10.
119. Upon the Governor's written request, the permit would be issued "for the purpose of
conducting archaeological research, excavation, removal, and curation, on behalf of the State or
its educational institutions to such Governor or such designee as the Governor deems qualified to
carry out the intent of this Act." 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(j) (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
120. The statute specifically omits the provisions in § 4(d) of the Act giving the federal land
manager power to impose permit conditions upon any permit issued to a state governor. 16
U.S.C. § 470cc(j) (Supp. III 1979). Assuming that this is not an error, 1t frees the state and Jts
designees from enforceable regulatory supervision in archaeological work. Although possibly
drafted to avoid federal enforcement actions against state employees, it is highly questionable
whether this exemption should have been provided.
121. See id. § 470cc(j). The language of the statute would seem to require that result since the
state's permit would not contain "terms and conditions." See note 120 supra. There is, however,
some uncertainty on this point. Rep. Udall, the floor manager for H.R. 1825, stated: "When State
Governors are given permits on request, they must identify the responsible individual, and if the
applicable provisions of the act are violated, the permit can be revoked." 125 CoN G. REc. H9088
(daily ed. October 12, 1979). Rep. Udall's brief remarks indicate his opinion that such a permittee
would be subject to at least the revocation sanction. It is worth noting that the Act's criminal and
civil penalties are available against any "person"-a defined term which includes "any officer,
employee, agent . . . of any State or political subdivision thereof." 16 U.S. C. § 470bb(6) (Supp.
III 1979). This would tend to support Rep. Udall's suggestion regarding revocation.
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potential for an abuse of discretion in contravention of the intent of the
statute.
Enforcement Procedures

The primary congressional motive for enacting the 1979 Act was to
create a significant deterrent to prevent looting of and damage to archaeologically significant sites located upon federal and Indian lands.
Beyond this general goal, Congress wished to extend the scope of criminal liability to include remote participants in the commercial exploitation of such sites. The Antiquities Act of 1906 had provided a criminal
penalty only for persons shown to "appropriate, excavate, injure or destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of
antiquity" located on federal lands without a permit. 122 This statute, in
addition to employing vague language, established a minimal deterrent
which in no way discouraged potential law violators. Although Congress perceived the need for stronger legislation, it also realized that a
broadly sweeping punitive section would encompass not only the acts
of commercial looters but also those of "innocent" members of the
public searching for arrowheads, bottles, and other collectible items. 123
The resulting legislation attempts to distinguish between those activities which should be soundly punished and those which are acceptable.
As with any enforcement statute, its success or failure will be determined by the way it produces the desired result-undamaged archaeological sites and artifacts. This, in turn, depends upon its reception in
the courts. 124
Criminal Penalties

After establishing a permit requirement, the Act defines three categories of prohibited acts which serve as potential bases for the imposition of a criminal penalty. 125 In this way, the 1979 Act may provide its
' 122. 16 u.s.c. § 433 (1976).
123. In order to accommodate such an innocuous use of federal lands, the congressional drafters specifically exempted ''the removal of arrowheads located on the surface of the ground" from
the criminal provisions of the Act. See id. § 470ee(g). This should be read as a narrow exception
to the general prohibition embodied in§ 6(a) of the Act and a deviation from the coverage of the
definition of "archaeological resource" included in§ 3(1). This exception may have unfortunate
consequences. The loss of surface indicators of significant underground sites generally should be
avoided since they serve as valuable tools for the archaeologist. Without such indicators, buried
structures and artifacts might never be located.
124. Significant criminal penalties are being imposed. In the first reported decision under the
1979 Act, Federal District Court Judge William P. Copple sentenced three men to jail terms ranging from twelve to eighteen months for illegal excavation activities in the Tonto National Forest in
Arizona. In addition, each defendant was fined $1,000 for stealing clay pots, bone owls, and
human skeletal remains from the prehistoric Indian ruins. N.Y. Times, June 7, 1980, at 6, cols. 4-5
(city ed.).
125. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a)-(c) (Supp. III 1979). The language of the criminal penalty provision
originated in the House bill and was adopted with only slight changes. See HousE REPoRT, supra
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most valuable function-the deterrence of major site looting activities.
Each one of the statutorily proscribed activities addresses a different
facet of the problem of antiquities theft and damage. First, no one may
"excavate, remove, damage or otherwise alter or deface any archaeological resource located on public lands or Indian lands" without a permit.126 This prohibition is composed of three material elements: (1)
the requisite act (excavating, removing etc.); (2) the relationship of an
"archaeological resource" to the act; and (3) the absence of a permit.
This section is similar to the existing langauge of the 1906 Antiquities
Act. 127 It prohibits, however, a greater range of acts and adds considerably more specificity to the definiton of the protected items. The congressional intent was undoubtedly to declare illegal the primary
activity in the archaeological site looting process. Active surveillance
combined with stiff judicially imposed penalties could make the Act
effective in slowing or stopping the actual site destruction.
Second, the new statute states that no one may "sell, purchase, exchange, transport, receive, or offer to sell, purchase, or exchange any
archaeological resource if such resource was excavated or removed"
either without a 1979 Act permit or in violation of any other federal
law. 128 This provision is intended to control the secondary activity associated with site damage-the movement and commerce in archaeological materials illegally taken from federal or Indian lands. As
before, this prohibition is comprised of three distinct segments: (1) the
illicit act (selling, purchasing, etc.); (2) the existence of a protected
archaeological resource; and (3) the illegal acquisition of that resource.
Third, the Act prohibits commerce in archaeological resources acquired in violation of "any provision, rule, regulation, ordinance, or
permit in effect under State or locallaw." 129 The attempt here was to
create, as a supplemental ground for federal enforcement, a separate
basis of federal criminal liability-presumably under the commerce
power-for a local law violation. In order to be an enforceable federal
note 75, at 4. The severity of the criminal penalty will depend upon the damage done to the site
and the number of prior convictions for similar charges. 16 U.S. C. § 470ee(d) (Supp. III 1979).
126. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a) (Supp. III 1979). Excavation and removal of archaeological resources is permissible if done either pursuant to a 1979 Act permit or a preexisting 1906 Act
permit or without a permit by an Indian authorized under tribal law.
127. The criminal law sanction of the 1906 Act reads as follows:
Any person who shall appropriate, excavate, injure, or destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity, situated on lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States, without the permission of the Secretary
of the Department of the Government having jurisdiction over the lands on which said
antiquities are situated, shall, upon conviction, be fined in a sum of not more than $500
or be imprisoned for a period of not more than ninety days, or shall suffer both fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
I d.§ 433.
128. Id. § 470ee(b).
129. I d. § 470ee(c).
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offense, however, the illegal act must bear some relationship to interstate or foreign commerce. 130
Taken together, these three sections strive to define and to prohibit
the range of activities comprising the commercial exploitation of
archaeological sites. Although a commercial motivation is not required
for criminal liability, it is certain that the congressional goal was to
stem the increasingly sophisticated pillage of federal lands for the purpose of financial gain.
After delineating the elements of the prohibited acts, the statute
then sets forth the ways in which the criminal penalty will be imposed.131 The Act makes the knowing violation of one of the three
proscriptions a criminal act, and extends such liability to anyone who
"counsels, procures, solicits, or employs any other person" 132 to violate
the law. At first, the statutO!'] language appears direct and unambiguous. But upon closer consideration, several troubling issues are manifested which could affect the way in which the courts will enforce the
statute. In light of the intended deterrent effect of the Act, the resolution of these interpretive questions could have a major impact upon the
Act's success or failure.
A major modification to preexisting law made by the 1979 Act was
the significant upgrading of criminal penalties available for judges to
impose upon the finding of a violation. 133 The meager sanctions provided by the 1906 Act 134 were far surpassed by the new law which established the maximum penalty for a first offense of one year of
imprisonm~nt, a $10,000 fine, or both. 135 This change to felony status
was accompanied by an unusual stipulation which could double the
130. This required relationship to interstate or foreign commerce was apparently believed to
be necessary on constitutional grounds. The violation of state or local law standing alone would
not be sufficient to ground the exercise of federal legislative authority without some specific connection to a federal power. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 5-4, at
232-36 (1978).
131. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d) (Supp. III 1979). There appears to be support in the legislative
history for the proposition that the criminal penalties found in the 1979 Act are not the exclusive
enforcement tools available to federal prosecutors. The House Report noted: ''The Committee is
aware that these penalties [in the 1979 Act] overlap with more general statutes and regulations,
and there is no intent to preclude action under those general provisions relating to the protection
of Federal property under appropriate circumstances." HousE REPORT, supra note 75, at 11. This
position is consistent with the ruling in United States v. Jones, 607 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1979), and
the views of the Department of Justice recorded in HousE REPORT, supra note 75, at 25.
132. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d) (Supp. III 1979). This language was drafted with the intention of
extending criminal liability under the Act beyond those who actually loot the protected sites to
cover others who arrange to have such illicit activities conducted in their behalf. The effort appears to be aimed at the commercially motivated dealers in antiquities who might contact others
to perform the illegal work.
133. I d. Virtually every hearing witness and congressional supporter of the new law stressed
the importance of strengthening the criminal sanctions against looting of sites. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 13; Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 41, 54-55, 59, 61.
134. See note 125 supra.
135. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d) (Supp. III 1979). This penalty, and the entire provision, was taken
in large part from § 7(b) of S. 490. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 5.
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available penalties for a first offense. Should the "commercial or
archaeological value" of the protected item involved in the criminal
offense and the "cost of [its] restoration and repair" exceed $5,000, the
initial penalty limits are automatically raised to imprisonment for two
years, $20,000 in fines, or both. 136 The rapidly escalating value of artifacts and the high cost of restoring the damage caused by looters will
cause the doubled criminal penalty maxima to be applied in many instances. The legislative drafters of this provision clearly meant to emphasize the seriousness of looting and damage to sites since they raised
the criminal penalty ceiling for a second or successive conviction under
the Act to five years imprisonment, $100,000 in fines, or both. 137 These
elevated statutory punishments will only have the desired deterrent effect if the surveillance of federal and Indian lands is significantly increased and successful prosecutions are brought against violators. In
order to truly influence the behavior of unscrupulous domestic and international art dealers, however, a federal enforcement action must be
pressed against individuals who would counsel, procure, solicit, or employ others to illegally obtain archaeological resources. The most severe penalties authorized by the statute should be directed against these
dealers.
The congressional drafters of the Act's criminal law enforcement
provision stated that violation of the statute would constitute a "general
intent" crime. 138 This position was adopted at the suggestion of federal
prosecutors who testified that such a designation would be necessary in
order to win convictions of those charged under the Act. 139 To obtain a
conviction, a person must be shown to "knowingly violate" 140 any one
of the three previously described prohibited acts. This language was
employed to describe the requisite state of mind or knowledge necessary to find a violation of the Act. The sparse legislative history of this
136. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d) (Supp. III 1979).
137. Id. The imposition of penalties of this magnitude was thought necessary to deter "these
operators who go out on public lands with a big scheme to mine an archaeological site and extract
material that belongs to the people of the United States as corporate property and sell it on the
antiquities market for the highest financial gain possible." Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at SS.
138. SENATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 9; HousE REPORT, supra note 75, at I I. The use of
such terminology does not necessarily clarify the important question of the defendant's requisite
knowledge as a precondition to criminal liability. The use of the term "general intent," without a
careful consideration of potential effects, may do more to confuse matters than to improve them.
See W. LA FAYE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 201-22 (1972).
139. In testimony before the Senate Parks Subcommittee, Michael D. Hawkins, United States
Attorney in Phoenix, Arizona, forcefully argued in favor of retaining the word "knowingly'' in
defining the criminal intent needed for conviction. Objecting to a standard which would imply a
specific intent requirement, Mr. Hawkins stated that such a test would require proof that "the
defendant acted intentionally, deliberately, and with the bad purpose of disobeying or disregarding the law." Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 59. This he argued would be difficult to accomplish and would require the granting of testimonial immunity to co-defendants for the production
of the necessary testimony establishing the requisite state of mind. I d.
140. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d) (Supp. III 1979).
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section of the new law indicates congressional intent that a person
charged with an offense under the Act need not be shown to have undertaken the illicit action with an awareness of its criminality. 141 It was
believed that use of the term ''willfully" would have changed the offense into a specific intent crime requiring the prosecutor to prove that
the defendant was cognizant of the statute's prohibition. 142 Consequently, a knowing violation of the statute's prohibitions was said to be
merely one which reflects an intentional or volitional act on the part of
the accused. 143 An examination of the prohibited acts defined by the
Act demonstrate~ the potentially broad application and possibly unintended results of this new "general intent" criminal law statute.
The Act specifies that anyone who excavates, removes, damages,
or otherwise alters or defaces an archaeological resource without permission violates the law. As previously stated these acts must be done
"knowingly." The offender must intend to take the action and it must
in fact affect an "archaeological resource." Questions could arise in
situations where the defendant claims that he was mistakenly excavating on federal lands while thinking he was on private or state property.
Cases involving the accidental or negligent destruction of artifacts or
sites would present a similar problem. The issue of the defendant's
knowledge of his precise location at the time of the incident could be an
important factor in a prosecution under the Act. The statute does not
provide any specific guidance for dealing with situations involving
good faith mistake or accident. But a more significant question concerns the knowledge required of a defendant in order to be found guilty
of a criminal violation under the Act. Would the purchaser of an ille141. The House committee report noted: "[T]his is a general intent crime, and therefore a
person could be convicted if he acted of his own volition and was aware of the acts he was committing." HousE REPORT, supra note 75, at 11. In a colloquy between Sen. Dale Bumpers and
United States Attorney Michael D. Hawkins during Senate hearings on S. 490, it was apparent
that Mr. Hawkins believed that a general intent statute did not require any proof that the person
charged had knowledge that he was violating a federal statute. Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at
58.
142. See Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 57 (remarks of Michael D. Hawkins, United States
Attorney); HousE REPORT, supra note 75, at 25 (letter from Patricia M. Wald, Assistant Attorney
General). The apparent intent of Congress was to construct a criminal sanction for the looting of
archaeological sites that would be ea5y to enforce. For example, the mere possession of an illegally acquired artifact was deleted from the list of prohibited acts originally present in S. 490,
probably because of the difficulty in proving the illicit acquisition of the article once possessed.
See 125 CoNG. REc. Sl0,832 (daily ed. July 30, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Bumpers). But see Andrus
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). In the Allard decision, the Court dealt with a similar problem in the
area of wildlife protection.
143. The only direct discussion of the significant questions concerning the requisite intent and
state of mind necessary for criminal liability is found in the House report on H.R. 1825. There the
committee noted: "This section also provides criminal penalties for those who knowingly commit
one of the prohibited acts. This is a general intent crime, and therefore a person could be convicted if he acted of his own volition and was aware of the acts he was committing." HousE
REPORT, supra note 75, at 11. This hardly constitutes an adequate discussion of the relatively
complex situations which may arise under the statute.
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gaily excavated artifact be subject to criminal prosecution without
proof of his actual knowledge of the illicit acquisition of the item by the
vendor or a prior owner? If the act was intended to function as a strict
liability criminal law then the answer would be affirmative. The same
question can be posed in connection with anyone who might come into
contact with an illegally acquired archaeological resource as a seller,
receiver, or transporter of the item. In addition, it would seem that the
prosecution's difficulty in tracing illegally acquired items into the secondary market would preclude the use of the statute's criminal sanctions in many situations. The fact that nearly identical artifacts could
have been lawfully excavated from nonfederallands makes the identification of the alleged contraband even more important. A more careful
attention to detail in the drafting of the criminal sanctions and in the
establishment of the pertinent legislative history would have avoided
much of this uncertainty. Subsequent judicial rulings will undoubtedly
add the necessary gloss on the statutory language.
Civil Penalties

Aside from the significant criminal sanctions provided by the Act,
the new statute also creates authority in federal land management officials to assess civil penalties against "any person who violates any prohibition contained in an applicable regulation or permit issued under
[the Act]." 144 The statutory language clearly anticipates the use of
monetary civil penalties as a discretionary enforcement technique
available in those instances where full criminal proceedings are inappropriate. 145 Unfortunately, little guidance is given to distinguish between sit:uations justifying a criminal prosecution under section 6 of the
Act and those for which an administratively imposed civil penalty is
appropriate. Although administrative regulations to be issued under
this section will define the offensive conduct to be punished by civil
penalties, the Act's legislative history demonstrates an intent to reach
only less serious occurrences. 146
Once a regulatory or permit violation is charged, the civil penalty
may not be formally assessed until the alleged violator is notified and
provided an opportunity for an administrative hearing. 147 The proceeding must be conducted as a formal adjudicatory hearing in con144. 16 U.S.C. § 470.ff(a)(l) (Supp. III 1979).
145. The creation of the civil penalty authority in § 7 of the Act establishes a specialized
power in federal land managers to administratively punish wrongdoers. Prior to the passage of
the 1979 legislation, similar power was considered to exist under the authority of other legislation.
See Senate Hearings, Sllpra note 21, at 45-46; 125 CONG. REc. Sl4,722 (daily ed. October 17,
1979) (remarks of Sen. Bumpers).
146. See HOUSE REPORT, Sllpra note 75, at 11; SENATE REPORT, st1pra note 75, at 9.
147. 16 U.S.C. § 470.ff(a)(l) (Supp. III 1979).
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formity with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act
with the federal land manager serving as the finder of fact. 148 The administrative penalty proceedings must also be conducted with attention
given to the need to produce a coherent and defensible record which
will serve as the basis for judicial review. Thereafter, the federal land
manager must establish the monetary penalty pursuant to uniform regulations. 149 The statute directs that the amount of the penalty be set
according to the value of the archaeological resource involved and the
cost of restoring the resource and the site. 150 Since there is no limitation placed on the size of the civil penalty imposed, the statutory criteria could result in the monetary civil penalty being as large or larger
than the monetary criminal sanction. This power to establish civil penalties provides the land manager with significant discretion. Once assessed, a civil penalty may be appealed to the local federal district court
as long as the review petition is filed within thirty days from the issuance of the administrative order. 151 Otherwise, judicial review is precluded. Finally, enforcement of the administrative penalty may take
the form of a civil action to collect the penalty brought in federal district court. At this stage in the penalty collection proceeding, the court
may not examine either the validity or the amount of the penalty. 152
The administrative penalty provision of the 1979 Act may prove to
be an extremely useful element in the federal program to protect
archaeological sites and artifacts. The discretionary authority of the
federal land managers can be used against illegal activities which
should be deterred but for which a criminal prosecution is unlikely or
unwarranted. It is possible that the criminal sanction will be employed
only in cases of large-scale, commercially motivated looting where the
complexity of the illicit activity and the need for punishment by incarceration requires a formal criminal prosecution. As with the enforcement of the criminal provision, the success of the civil sanction depends
upon thorough surveillance of the public lands and careful investigation in preparing the charge. One of the most difficult tasks in the administration of the civil remedy will be the discrimination between
those actions considered innocuous and those for which a civil fine will
be sought. A balance must be struck so that minor or technical viola148. Id. § 470.1f(c).
149. Id. § 470.1f(a)(l). As of May 1, 1980, no regulations have been published in the Federal
Register. The statute did not specify a time limit on the development of uniform regulations. See
16 U.S.C. § 470ii(a) (Supp. III 1979); note 31 supra. The Interior Department conducted field
hearings in Denver, Phoenix, Portland, and Knoxville during the Spring of 1980 to solicit public
opinion prior to the preparation of the uniform regulations. See 45 Fed. Reg. 17,622 (1980).
150. 16 U.S.C. § 470.1f(a)(2)(A), (B) (Supp. III 1979). But see note 145 supra.
151. 16 U.S.C. § 470.1f(b)(l) (Supp. III 1979).
152. Id. § 470ff(b)(2).
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tions of the Act will not give rise to harsh penalties which could undermine public support for the statutory purpose.
Additional Sanctions
In an effort to encourage individuals to provide information con-

cerning violations of the Act, a monetary reward mechanism was included in the statute. 153 Under its terms, an informant giving
information leading to either a civil fine or a criminal conviction may
receive up to one-half of the financial penalty imposed upon the guilty
party, with a maximum reward of $500. 154 The apparent legislative
intention was to provide a persuasive economic incentive to those persons having information necessary for enforcement proceedings to step
forward and make themselves known to the federal authorities. However, the relatively low maximum reward permitted by the statute may
result in few informants willing to implicate others in potentially serious criminal activity. A higher reward limit might encourage more
participation and willingness to assume the risks associated with providing this type of information. 155
The 1979 Act further provides for the forfeiture of "[a]ll archaeological resources with respect to which a violation [of the Act has] occurred and which are in the possession of any person" 156 and all
"vehicles and equipment" 157 used in connection with a violation of the
statute. Imposition of the forfeiture sanction is at the discretion of the
trial judge or the administrative law judge and requires an underlying
criminal conviction or civil penalty assessment. 158 The new statute thus
permits forfeiture to the federal government of both the means and the
fruits of illicit activities. If the illegal conduct occurred on Indian
lands, all fines and forfeited items must be given to the Indian tribe or
individuai:159 Although the language of the law appears to provide for
forfeiture of artifacts innocently possessed and of vehicles used in the
illegal act even if stolen, the discretionary nature of the authority will
153. I d.§ 470gg(a). The rewards are to be paid from the fines collected under the Act and will
not require an annual appropriation. Id.
154. Id.
155. The House bill-H.R. 1825-had originally provided for rewards up to $1500. 125
CoNG. REc. H5511 (daily ed. J~ly 9, 1979). This figure was reduced to $500 to be consistent with
the Senate's language and its reasoning that by reducing the maximum amount payable as a re·
ward it would discourage "frivolous allegations aimed at obtaining a large reward." SENATE RE·
PORT, supra note 75, at 10. The Senate Committee's wisdom may be subject to question in light of
the nature of the illicit activity involved.
156. 16 U.S.C. § 470gg(b) (Supp. III 1979).
157. Id.
158. Id. The statute also requires a formal determination that the archaeological resource or
other item forfeited be involved in the violation. Id.
159. Id. § 470gg(c). There does not appear to be any discretion in these cases to award the
fines or forfeited items to the United States rather than to the Indian tribe or individual.
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probably ensure that it will be exercised solely against the wrongdoers
themselves. 160 By consistently imposing the sanction of forfeiture, the
courts and the land management agencies can significantly raise the
financial cost of a statutory violation and thereby enhance the deterrent
effect of the new law.
CONCLUSION

On the most basic level, the 1979 Act responds to the immediate
need to correct a serious deficiency in federal law caused by the Ninth
Circuit's decision in .Diaz. The new statute, however, reflects the difficulty inherent in a legislative approach to a complex problem area not
amenable to legal definition. Furthermore, this regulatory effort has
uncovered significant conflicts of opinion concerning the use and management of the vast federal landholdings in the western portion of the
nation. As a harbinger of future political and legal change, the
archaeological resource issue demonstrates the growing state interest in
the development of federal lands. This conflict in federalism will undoubtedly be confronted in other contexts during the coming decade.
Viewing the 1979 cultural resources statute critically, a number of
comments can be made. First, the statute contains several important
drafting errors which at the least may result in confusing interpretations and at worst may make criminal enforcement practically impossible. Furthermore, the legislative history for the statute is scant and is
of little assistance on several crucial points. Greater attention should
have been paid to the articulation of legislative principles and effective
exposition.
Secondly, the decisionmaking structure adopted by the 1979 Act
relies upon local administration of the permitting program with no external review. The local land manager is empowered to make important decisions regarding the exploitation of an archaeological site
guided only by uniform regulations. Moreover, this decision is specifically exempted from the specialized review process created under
NHPA. 161 This lack of integration with other statutory requirements
should have been avoided. Although an individual-or public interest
group could judicially challenge the land manager's decision to grant a
permit as a deviation from statutory or regulatory requirements, such a
recourse is expensive and uncertain in its outcome. By vesting the permitting power in this fashion, Congress has treated archaeological site
160. The House committee's report on the forfeiture provision states: "[I]t is expected that the
courts and the administrative law judges would exercise their discretion to avoid unduly burdensome forfeitures of property belonging to persons who neither know nor could have known of the
illegal activities." HousE REPORT, supra note 75, at 11. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 9.
161. 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.1-800.15 (1979).
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exploration as an unexceptional land management function. Congress
should have developed a procedure for issuing permits that would have
required an expedited external review of proposals by an expert body.
As the Act is presently constructed, the individual decisions of land
managers may go unreviewed in any other forum.
Another criticism of the congressional policy focuses upon the jurisdictional exemptions from the statute's coverage. The Act carefully
excludes from its protections archaeological resources located ·on private, state or Outer Continental Shelf lands. If the federal policy is to
protect the nation's cultural history, some thought must be given to extension of regulatory power by some level of government to nonfederal
lands. The discrimination in protection available to archaeological
sites depending upon their location may ultimately result in the loss of
valuable sites and artifacts on nonfederallands. Congress should have .
at least explained this inconsistency in policy.
Finally, the statute can be criticized for the substantive policy position adopted. The Act takes a narrow view of the problem of cultural
resource protection and merely seeks to create a locally administered
permit system accompanied by criminal and civil sanctions for violation of the regulations or statutory proscriptions. The statute approaches the problem of antiquities destruction as one of remedying
deficiencies in legal sanctions. Of course, legally valid criminal and
civil penalty provisions coupled with careful surveillance and vigorous
enforcement may deter looting by individuals. If there is a significant
decrease in this illicit activity, then the new law will accomplish a great
deal. Congress, however, could have adopted a more protective policy
by granting antiquities a preferential position when confronted by potentially destructive, governmentally supported actions. The Endangered Species Act 162 and section 4(f) of the Department of
Transportation Act 163 could serve as models for such a provision. In its
present form, the statute does not contemplate nor does it authorize the
denial of a permit in order to leave an archaeological site in its undisturbed form. Such a policy would preserve sites for future examination
with new methods.
In conclusion, this analysis of the 1979 Act demonstrates a number
of important points. Society is increasingly aware of the need to protect the nation's cultural history. This is evident in the wide-ranging
support given to the 1979 Act. The new law also illustrates the existence of countervailing considerations inherent in the adoption of any
policy position. In this case, the expansion of federal regulatory control
162. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1542 (Supp. III 1979).
163. 49 u.s.c. § 1653(f) (1976).
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for antiquities protection is perceived as interfering with state power
over lands within that state and free public use of federal lands. The
value accorded the protected interest must be weighed against the other
competing interests. It is clear that the Act represents a partial solution
to the multifaceted problem of cultural resources protection. For this
legislative approach to be successful, the general public must be educated to understand the social importance of antiquities and to discourage noncommercial violations of the statute. In addition, federal land
managers must take antiquities protection seriously, and they must be
supplied with sufficient personnel to properly supervise the lands under
their control. With this support, the intentional commercial violators
may be deterred. The protection of archaeological sites and artifacts
cannot be ignored. Once our prehistoric cultural history is lost, it is
gone forever.
·

